

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 2201

E.O. 11652: GDS-12/31/82

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: 22 APRIL NPG STAFF GROUP MEETING

REF: (A) NPG(STAFF GROUP)WP(74)5(REVISED); (B) USNATO 1750;

(C) STATE 069712; (D) NPG (STAFF GROUP)N'74)42

BEGIN SUMMARY: AT 22 APRIL STAFF GROUP (SG) MEETING, TURKISH REP SAID HIS AUTHORITIES HOPE THAT SECRETARY SCHLESINGER WOULD ADDRESS RETARGETING IN THE DPC OR NUCLEAR DEFENSE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (NDAC) FOR THE BENEFIT OF THOSE COUNTRIES WHO WILL NOT BE AT THE BERGEN NPG MEETING. SG CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF DRAFT PERM REPS REPORT ON WARSAW PACT STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE. CANADA QUESTIONED NEED FOR NPG REPORT TO DPC ON THIS SUBJECT, BUT OTHER SG MEMBERS CONTINUED TO SUPPORT THIS APPROACH. SG AGREED ON UK REDRAFT OF PARAS 3-10 OF DRAFT REPORT FOR DPC DESIGNED TO BRING TEXT MORE INTO LINE WITH NPG WARSAW PACT STUDY. SG DISCUSSED TASKING OF MILITARY AUTHORITIES FOR PREPARATION OF A NEW ILLUSTRATIVE STUDY.

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END SUMMARY.

1. AT 22 APRIL NPG STAFF GROUP MEETING, TUKISH REP (SUNGAR) SAID THAT COUNTRIES, INCLUDING TURKEY, WHICH WILL NOT BE AT

THE BERGEN NPG MEETING WILL NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR SECRETARY SCHLESINGERS COMMENTS ON RETARGETING IN HIS BRIEFING ON STRATEGIC BALANCE. HE SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES HOPE THAT SECRETARY SCHLESINGER WOULD BE ABLE TO REPEAT HIS COMMENTS IN THE DPC OR NDAC FOR THE BENEFIT OF COUNTRIES NOT PRESENT AT BERGEN. HE SAID HIS AMBASSADOR PLANNED TO DISCUSS THIS PROCEDURAL QUESTION DURING THE DISCUSSION OF RETARGETING AT THE 16 MAY NPG PERM REPS MEETING. COMMENT: TURKEY ENVISIONS A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE NDAC THAT WOULD IMMEDIATELY PRECEED THE DPC MEETING ON 14 JUNE, NOT THE NORMAL MEETING OF THE NDAC IN DECEMBER. END COMMENT.

ACTION REQUESTED: GUIDANCE FOR DISCUSSING THIS QUESTION WITH ALLIES.

2. STAFF GROUP CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF THE DRAFT PERM REPS REPORT ON THE NPG STUDY ON WARSAW PACT STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (REF (A))--POUCHED TO STATE AND DEFENSE). CANADIAN REP (BECKETT) SAID HIS AUTHORITIES WERE NOT CONVINCED OF THE NEED TO SEND AN NPG REPORT ON THIS SUBJECT TO THE DPC BECAUSE IN THEIR VIEW IT WOULD OVERSTRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY AS A PLANNING TOOL. DANISH REP (ROSENTHAL) AGREED, BUT SAID HE THOUGHT HIS AUTHORITIES WERE FLEXIBLE ON THIS QUESTION. ALL OTHER SG REPS CONTINUED TO SUPPORT APPROACH OF SENDING REPORT TO THE DPC, INCLUDING US REP (WOODWORTH) PER MISSION RECOMMENDATIONS IN REF (B), AND WASHINGTON GUIDANCE IN REF (C). CANADIAN REP UNDERTOOK TO SEE WHETHER HIS AUTHORITIES COULD AGREE TO THE DPC APPROACH IN VIEW OF GENERAL CONSENSUS ON THIS QUESTION, AND REPORT BACK WITHIN A COUPLE OF DAYS SO IS COULD ISSUE, IF POSSIBLE, FINAL AGREED DRAFT OF REPORT.

3. UK REP (HARFORD) TABLED REDRAFT OF PARAS 3-10 OF THE DRAFT REPORT FOR DPC (PROVIDED IN PARA 7 BELOW) DESIGNED TO MAKE THE TEXT OF THE REPORT TRACK MORE CLOSELY WITH THE WARSAW PACT STUDY. SG ACCEPTED REDRAFT WITHOUT CHANGE.

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ACTION REQUESTED: IS HOPES TO ISSUE FINAL DRAFT OF THE REPORT THIS WEEK SO IT CAN BE CIRCULATED TO CAPITALS IN ADEQUATE TIME PRIOR TO 16 MAY NPG PERM REPS MEETING. UNLESS ADVISED OTHERWISE ON OR BEFORE THURSDAY, 25 APRIL, MISSION WILL ASSUME UK REDRAFT IN PARA 7 BELOW IS ACCEPTABLE TO WASHINGTON.

4. SG ALSO MADE A FEW EDITORIAL CHANGES IN THE DRAFT REPORT ON WARSAW PACT STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE TO REFLECT LANGUAGE THAT IS IN CURRENT DRAFT OF NEW EDITION OF MC 161 THAT IS NOW BEING CLEARED IN CAPITALS.

5. IN CONTEXT OF DISCUSSION OF IS DRAFT PO ON NPG FUTURE

WORK PROGRAM (REF (D)-- POUCHED TO STATE AND DEFENSE), SG CHAIRMAN SAID HE HAD DRAFTED A LETTER FOR SYG LUNS SIGNATURE REQUESTING MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO PREPARE AN ILLUSTRATIVE STUDY FOR NPG MINISTERS TO ADDRESS IN 1975. SHAPE REP (COL SMITH) NOTED THAT USE OF ADM'S AND USE IN AN EXTENDED GEOGRAPHIC AREA WERE REMAINING OPTIONS FROM THE INITIAL USE GUIDELINES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN ADDRESSED IN PREVIOUS ILLUSTRATIVE STUDIES. HE THOUGHT THAT SOME COUNTRIES MIGHT HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT STUDY OF THESE SUBJECTS. SG CHAIRMAN SAID DRAFT LETTER FROM LUNS REQUESTED A STUDY OF BATTLEFIELD USE. US REP SAID THAT AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, THE SUBJECT OF AN ILLUSTRATIVE STUDY SHOULD BE AGREED BY NPG COUNTRIES. HE AGREED THIS COULD BE DONE IN THE SG, OR PERHAPS BY PERM REPS, BUT IN ANY CASE COUNTRIES SHOULD EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS. SG AGREED TO DISCUSS MATTER AGAIN AT NEXT MEETING ON 29 APRIL. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON GUIDANCE ON PREFERRED SUBJECT FOR ILLUSTRATIVE STUDY AND PREFERENCE, IF ANY, FOR FORUM FOR DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT BY NPG COUNTRIES.

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6. NORWEGIAN REP SAID, IN REFERENCE TO ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE BERGEN NPG MEETING, THAT HIS AUTHORITIES PLAN A "MINI-CRUISE" ON A FJORD ON 10 JUNE FOR ALL MEMBERS OF DELEGATIONS. CRUISE WILL DEPART BETWEEN 1300 AND 1400 HRS AND RETURN AT APPROXIMATELY 2400 HRS, OR EARLIER IF DESIRED. DINNER WILL BE SERVED. HE SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE FURTHER DETAILS AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE.

7. BEGIN TEXT OF UK DRAFT OF PARAS 3-10 OF DRAFT REPORT FOR

THE DPC ON WARSAW PACT STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE:

...WHILE FULLY RECOGNISING THE NEED AND VALUE OF THE NATO AGREED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BASE, WE AGREED WITH THE WP STUDY THAT AN EXAMINATION OF THESE UNQUANTIFIABLE FACTORS IS DESIRABLE, SINCE IT EXPANDS THE BASIS FOR NATO DECISION MAKING.

4. WE NOTE THE STUDY'S CONCLUSION THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO BE DOGMATIC ABOUT THE COURSE OF ACTION THE WP MIGHT TAKE IN AN ACTUAL CONFLICT, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND WE AGREE THAT NATO DECISIONS IN THE
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EVENT OF HOSTILITIES SHOULD NOT BE BASED SOLELY ON A SINGLE ASSUMPTION OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WP MIGHT RESPOND TO NATO USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE QUESTION OF WP INTENTIONS AND LIKELY ACTIONS IS CENTRAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO'S DEFENCE POLICY AND TO THE ROLE OF ALLIED NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHIN THAT POLICY, AND THEREFORE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT NATO DECISION MAKERS SHOULD BE AWARE NOT ONLY OF WP MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND THE WP DECLARED MILITARY DOCTRINE CONCERNING POSSIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT ALSO OF OTHER FACTORS THAT MAY INFLUENCE THE WARSAW PACT IN WAR.

WP TACTICAL NUCLEAR OPTIONS

5. THE NATO AGREED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT INDICATES, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT THE WP MIGHT RESORT TO PRE-EMPTIVE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, OR TO WIDE-SCALE RETALIATION IN THE EVENT OF NATO TACTICAL USE, SINCE THE WP DOES NOT SUBSCRIBE TO A FORMAL STRATEGY OF GRADUATED NUCLEAR RESPONSE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE WP STUDY NOTES FROM EVIDENCE IN THE INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT THAT, ALTHOUGH THE WP DOES NOT HAVE THE SAME RANGE OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND YIELDS AVAILABLE TO NATO, WP MILITARY FORCES HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO EXERCISE A WIDE RANGE OF OPTIONS FOR THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS CAPABILITY APPEARS TO ENCOMPASS NOT ONLY THE DEVELOPMENT OF A VARIETY OF NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN WP FORCES BUT ALSO THE BASIC COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS THAT WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE WP, AND PARTICULARLY THE SOVIET NATIONAL LEADERSHIP, TO EXECUTE ANY OF THE OPTIONS OPEN TO THEM ON A CONTROLLED AND SELECTIVE BASIS IF THE POLITICAL DECISION TO DO SO WERE TAKEN. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE ACTUAL NUCLEAR POSTURE MAINTAINED BY THE WP DOES NOT IN ITSELF LIMIT THE OPTIONS OPEN TO THE WP TO THOSE MENTIONED EARLIER IN THIS PARAGRAPH, IE PRE-EMPTIVE OR WIDE-SCALE RETALIATION.

6. THE NATO AGREED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT ALSO ACKNOWLEDGES SOVIET AWARENESS OF THE DANGERS OF UNCONTROLLED ESCALATION INHERENT IN ANY NATO - WARSAW PACT CONFLICT, AND THE PROBABILITY THAT THE WP WOULD SEEK TO LIMIT AND/OR TO END THE CONFLICT THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS. THE WP STUDY SEEKS TO

EXPLORE THESE ASPECTS FURTHER, AND ALTHOUGH IT RECOGNISES THE
AUTHORATIVE INTELLIGENCE VIEWS EMPHASIS ON THE POSSIBILITY THAT IF
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NATO WERE TO USE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE SOVIETS CAN BE EXPECTED

TO RETALIATE ON A WIDE-SCALE, THE STUDY IDENTIFIES AND DISCUSSES
A NUMBER OF FACTORS THAT MIGHT INDUCE THE WP IN AN ACTUAL
CONFLICT TO ADOPT A CAUTIOUS AND FLEXIBLE COURSE OF ACTION IN
THEIR APPROACH TO THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE
STUDY THEN GOES ON, TO ASSESS THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO OF
SUCH A CAUTIOUS APPROACH BY THE WP. IT OBSERVES THAT ON THE
ASSUMPTION OF SUCH AN APPROACH IT IS NOT UNREASONABLE TO
SUPPOSE THAT FOLLOWING THE DEMONSTRATION OF NATO'S WILL AND
RESOLVE (INCLUDING IF NECESSARY RESORT TO SELECTIVE TACTICAL
USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS) THE SOVIETS WOULD DECIDE TO HALT
THEIR AGGRESSION. THE WP STUDY ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THIS ONLY ONE
POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF SUCH AN ATTITUDE OF CAUTION, BUT THAT
ALTERNATIVELY THE WP MIGHT OPT FOR A NUCLEAR RESPONSE WHICH STILL
MIGHT BE VERY RESTRAINED OR WHICH, IF NATOS USE HAD CAUSED SIGNIFI-
CANT INTERFERENCE WITH WP MILITARY PLANS, EVEN SO WOULD NOT
UNNECESSARILY EXCEED THE LOWEST LEVEL CAPABLE OF RESTORING THE
MILITARY SITUATION. WP FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS CONSIDERED
VERY UNLIKELY, INDEED CONCEIVABLE ONLY IN A SITUATION IN WHICH
THEIR CONVENTIONAL ATTACK SEEMED IN DANGER OF BEING UNABLE TO
ACHIEVE ITS VITAL OBJECTIVES AND - PERHAPS EVEN MORE UNLIKELY -
WHEN SOVIET LEADERS WISHED TO BE FIRST WITH A DEMONSTRATION
OF POLITICAL RESOLVE.

7. THE WP STUDY POINTS OUT THAT THERE ARE PROBABLY TWO DISINCT
(AND SOMETIMES CONFLICTING) INFLUENCES THAT WILL HAVE CRITICAL
IMPACT ON WP POLITICAL MILITARY STRATEGY AND ON WP DECISIONS
DURING AN ACTUAL CONFLICT: THE AGGRESSIVE STANCE COMPATIBLE
WITH COMMUNIST REVOLUTIONARY AIMS, AND THE DEFENSIVE ATTITUDE
AGAINST A PERCEIVED WESTERN THREAT. THIS FACTOR, COMBINED WITH
THE RISK THAT NATO MAY TEND TO ASSUME THAT THE SOVIET UNION
WOULD VIEW POLITICO MILITARY ISSUES IN THE SAME WAY AS NATO,
MAY INHIBIT NATOS ABILITY TO ANALYSE CORRECTLY SOVIET VIEWS.
THE NATURE OF THE THREAT AS PERCEIVED BY EACH SIDE WILL CLEARLY
HAVE A CRITICAL IMPACT ON THEIR RESPECTIVE POLITICO-MILITARY
DOCTRINE, AND THIS HIGHLIGHTS THE NEED FOR NATO TO ENSURE THAT
ITS OWN POLICY AND ACTIONS AVOID POSSIBILITIES OF
MISINTERPRETATION.

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IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO'S DETERRENT POSTURE

8. IN THE LIGHT OF THE POSSIBILITIES FOR MISINTERPRETATION MENTIONED ABOVE, NATO MUST CONTINUE TO TAKE POSITIVE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT ITS DETERRENT POSTURE DOES NOT PROVOKE THE AGRESSION IT IS INTENDED TO DETER. SIMILARLY, WE SUGGEST THAT CONTINUING EFFORTS ARE NECESSARY TO MAKE THE WP AWARE OF NATO'S CONCERN OVER THE WP AGGRESSIVE STANCE. EVEN IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES NATO MUST CONTINUE TO GIVE ATTENTION TO THESE CONSIDERATIONS SO AS TO MAINTAIN THE CONTINUING OBJECTIVES OF DETERRENCE, PARTICULARLY IF THE INITIAL FIGHTING IS AT A RELATIVELY LOW INTENSITY.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CONFLICT TERMINATION

9. THE WP STUDY OBSERVES THAT THE MOST SATISFACTORY WP RESPONSE (IN NATOS EYES) TO NATO INITIAL USE, AND ONE WHICH FITS WITH AN ASSUMPTION OF CAUTION ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, WOULD BE A FULFILMENT OF NATO'S DETERRENT STRATEGY BY A SOVIET DECISION TO HALT THE AGGRESSION. WE NOTE, IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE
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PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE INITIAL DEFENSIVE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE STATED THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE THREAT OF FURTHER ESCALATION IS TO INDUCE THE ENEMY TO MAKE THE POLITICAL DECISION TO CEASE HIS ATTACK AND TO WITHDRAW. NATOS THREAT OF FURTHER ESCALATION IN THIS CASE WOULD HAVE TO BE SUCH THAT DETERRENCE DURING ANY CONFLICT WOULD NOT ONLY HAVE TO WORK AGAINST ANY INTENSIFICATION OR CONTINUATION OF ENEMY ACTION BUT WOULD HAVE TO OPERATE ALSO IN A WAY WHICH CONTRIBUTES, IN ADDITION OTO OTHER POLITICAL AND MILITARY STEPS, TO THE FINAL ENEMY WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO TERRITORY.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

10. WE BELIEVE THE ANALYSIS IN THE WP STUDY AND THE COMMENTS IN THIS REPORT MAY BE OF INTEREST TO THE DPC AND OF POTENTIAL VALUE TO OTHER NATO BODIES AND AGENCIES IN THE CONDUCT OF THEIR PLANNING AND ACTIVITIES. THE STUDY HAS HIGHLIGHTED THE FACT THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THERE TO BE ANY DOGMATIC AND SPECIFIC PREDICTIONS IN THIS FIELD, NOT ONLY BECAUSE THERE ARE LIMITATIONS TO OUR SOURCES OF INFORMATION, BUT ALSO BECAUSE THE FACTORS AFFECTING WP POLICIES MAY CHANGE. A MEANINGFUL UNDERSTANDING OF WP POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SHOULD THEREFORE BE ENHANCED BY CONTINUING EFFORTS TO ASSEMBLE AND ANALYSE CURRENT AND AUTHORITATIVE INFORMATION.

11. IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE THE WP STUDY'S MAIN CONCLUSION IS THAT NATO DECISIONS IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES WITH THE WARSAW PACT SHOULD NOT BE BASED SOLELY ON A SINGLE ASSUMPTION OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WARSAW PACT MIGHT RESPOND. WE ENDORSE THIS CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTED THAT THE SUBJECT OF THE STUDY MERITS CONTINUING ATTENTION IN VIEW OF ITS RELEVANCE TO NATO'S PEACETIME DETERRENT POSTURE AND TO POSSIBLE NATO COURSES OF ACTION IN TIME OF TENSION OR CONFLICT.

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